When the European Union and the United States announced a new trade framework agreement in August 2025, relief spread across Brussels. After years of transatlantic frictions and fears of renewed tariff wars, a negotiated settlement looked like a sign of stability. Yet, beyond the celebratory language, the details reveal an uncomfortable truth: Europe is tying its technological future ever more tightly to Washington’s interests, at the expense of its own ambitions for sovereignty.
Back in September 2023, as the EU Chips Act entered into force, one could be forgiven for finally believing that a technological decoupling was finally taking place. Europe, so reliant on American and Asian partners for high-tech components like semiconductors, seemed to have finally realised that long term economic stability and technological resilience would require an expansion of onshore European capabilities, especially in the context of the digital and green transitions.
The Chips Act promised more than €43 billion in public and private funds to “strengthen technological leadership” and “set measures to prepare, anticipate and swiftly respond to any future supply chain disruption.” Moreover, with Europe holding just 9% of the global chip manufacturing market, down appreciably from 44% in 1990, Chips Act aims to increase Europe’s share to 20% by 2030. This proactive step towards technological sovereignty symbolised Europe’s belief in its own ability to become a global tech hub no longer dependant on other markets. Yet, just 2 years later, the promise, buried in the joint communiqué, to buy up to $40 billion worth of US AI Chips runs counter to these measures, undermines the EU’s efforts to reinforce internal resilience and puts its long-stated goal of technological independence at risk.
A deal weighted to Washington
The framework agreement, signed on 21 August, establishes a new balance of trade between the world’s two largest economic blocs. The United States pledged to cap tariffs on sensitive sectors, including semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and lumber, at 15 per cent, halting ongoing investigations that had threatened steep duties. In return, the EU agreed to eliminate tariffs on all US industrial goods, open its agricultural markets wider to American producers, and commit to massive energy imports—$750 billion of US oil and gas by 2028.
But it is the technology clauses that are most troubling. Alongside the $40 billion chip purchase, the EU also pledged to align its technology security requirements with those of the United States, in a “concerted effort to avoid technology leakage to destinations of concern.” The wording may appear technical, but the consequence is political: Washington will set the standards, and Europe will adapt. The US even committed to “endeavour to facilitate such exports once such requirements are in place.” This sounds very much like a promise that makes Europe’s access to chips contingent on American goodwill.
Critical voices calling for European technological sovereignty may however take heart in the aspirational rather than binding nature of the language used. Specifics are lacking, no timeline is set, and it is unclear how many chips are to be bought, or how. These are shaky foundations for a somewhat ambiguous agreement. But for critics, this remains a framework designed for a rather one-sided arrangement. The US extracts guaranteed markets for its technology and energy exports, while Europe gains only the removal of tariffs that had been imposed as leverage in the first place.
Undermining European sovereignty
The contradictions of the dichotomy between the Chips Act and the U.S.-EU agreement are stark. The Chips Act was designed to support innovative EU firms and to anchor the next generation of high-performance computing in Europe itself. By obliging itself to buy tens of billions of dollars of US chips, Europe risks starving its own industry of demand.
Indeed, CEOs of these companies are well aware that European policy-makers need to take more concrete steps to shore up European industrial capabilities in terms of technology. “We have the will to stay sovereign and not depend on the US or China. We want to remain a European company supported by the EU,” remarked SiPearl CEO, Philippe Notton. “In a perfect world, TSMC would have a fab in Europe, or a 100% European fab would be our partner to produce chips. Still, such a perspective today feels far away as far as I can see. Japan with Rapidus could be a model in this matter for the Europeans.”
Notton has also stressed the need for collective action: “There is a global competition to capture the value chain of semiconductors. Europe needs to pool resources—through EuroHPC, EIC, France 2030, and other instruments—if we want to compete with the United States and China.” His message is one of partnership within Europe, not dependency on partners outside it.
Strategic challenges
There is also a certain amount of strategic risk tied to dependency on global partners. The risk is not merely economic but strategic. High-performance computing (HPC) and AI chipsare the backbone of future defence, scientific research, and industrial competitiveness. If Europe relies on imports to power its supercomputers, its data centres, and its AI models, then the entire edifice of sovereignty—political, economic, and even military—rests on US supply chains.
Anders Dam Jensen, Executive Director of EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, has repeatedly emphasised the importance of sovereignty in HPC procurement. While he is not responsible for the trade agreement, the implications of such purchases touch directly on EuroHPC’s mission: ensuring that European research and industry can rely on secure, independent, and competitive computing capacity. “Developing a strong European HPC supply chain with independent components and technologies is key to achieve strategic autonomy and digital sovereignty in Europe. The three projects, EPI 2, EUPEX and The European PILOT are critical to make successful our transition towards exascale while developing a world-class, competitive and innovative supercomputing ecosystem across Europe,” he stated.
The political context only sharpens the stakes. With Donald Trump back in the White House, European negotiators may have sought to buy peace by offering concessions. But appeasement is not strategy. As critics noted even during the talks, Brussels feared Trump’s threats of tariffs and yielded too much ground. Now, in the cold light of day, the imbalance is evident.
If the EU is serious about its proclaimed goals—strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty, industrial resilience—it must ensure that trade agreements reinforce rather than contradict them. According to Annemie Turtelboom, who was in charge of a recent damning report by the official European court of auditors (ECA), “the EU urgently needs a reality check in its strategy for the microchips sector.” She continued: “We are competing in a global race, but from the back of the field, and it is unclear whether we have the means to be successful in this race [or the] competencies to support the industry, and the funding we have available is fragmented and scattered.” In other words, the EU has to get its act together or risk falling by the wayside in the long term. Focusing on European manufacturing rather than increasing dependence on the U.S. would be a start…
