The wide range of defence capabilities showcased at the MSPO arms fair in Poland in early September and Poland’s commitment to all sectors came as no surprise to those who have been following the country’s defence strategy since 2022. Poland has been rearming at remarkable speed, and a new drive for European strategic autonomy has seen it turn increasingly towards its European partners for high-end military hardware.
Germany’s Zeitenwende has taken hold across Europe as the growing threat from Russia continues to cause deep concern. The logical response has been decisive rearmament programs, especially in central and eastern Europe. Recognising the Russian threat since the annexation of Crimea, Poland has embarked on a program of far-reaching military expansion.
The country has long relied on the U.S. as a central supplier and security anchor, but ideological antagonism between Prime Minister Tusk and the Trump administration has put real strain on relations. It has also fallen foul of the Trump administration’s isolationist fervour, putting further pressure on the country’s dependency on American military procurement. This means that looking to Europe for high-end procurement may now become critical, which aligns with a general desire for strategic autonomy within the European halls of power.
Poland rearms
Speaking after a European defence ministers meeting in Warsaw back in April, Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz declared that Poland is aiming to spend 5% of its GDP on defence in 2026. “We must be ready for the most difficult scenarios and we must be strong enough to prevent war from breaking out… This is an action to make us so strong that it would not be profitable for any country to attack the European Union or NATO,” he told reporters. Indeed, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, no NATO member has spent a higher amount of its GDP on defence than Poland. In 2024, military spending soared by 31 % to roughly USD 38 billion, reaching about 4.2 % of GDP, matching estimates of 4.12 % of GDP—the largest military burden among NATO members.
In parallel, Poland is building domestic military-production capacity. The aforementioned ammunition factories—one for projectiles, one for propellants—are intended to make 155 mm artillery shells, greatly reducing reliance on foreign suppliers. This effort includes plans to acquire technology and licences, with partners potentially from France, Germany, South Korea, or Turkey. Moreover, Warsaw has signed a PLN 5.8 billion (approx. USD 1.6 billion) deal with the PGZ-Narew consortium for 46 passive-location radars, enhancing short-range anti-air and anti-missile defences ahead of perceived Russian threats.
Not insignificantly, Poland can now boast Europe’s largest land army (3rd largest in NATO behind the U.S. and Türkiye), more than doubling the size of its personnel—from 100,000 to 216,000—between 2014 and 2025. Just a few weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine, the country passed the Homeland Defence Act, which envisioned expanding its armed forces to 300,000 men and women at arms. Prime Minister Tusk has gone further, calling for an army of up to 500,000, including reservists, in order to create a force “adequate to possible threats”.
Supplier diversification
But until recently, conventional rearmaments patterns have dictated what has become an over-reliance on foreign suppliers—notably the U.S. in the form of F-35 fighter jets and Abrams Tanks. The Homeland Defence Act also outlined army modernisation through 1,000 K2 tanks and 600 K9 howitzers from South Korea.
Yet an emerging shift is visible. Poland is increasingly sourcing critical coastal anti-ship capability from Europe. The Naval Strike Missile (NSM), developed by Norwegian firm Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace back in 2023, selected by Poland and showcased at MSPO of that year, is a key item. Originally procured in land-based form in 2008–11, NSM installations are intended for Poland’s maritime and coastal defence, particularly to counter Russian naval activity in the Baltic Sea. Poland signed a EUR 2 billion contract in 2023 with the Norwegian firm.
Poland is also forging strategic partnerships across Europe. In May 2025, in Nancy, it signed a Treaty of Enhanced Cooperation and Friendship with France, framed as “ground-breaking.” The treaty includes mutual military assistance clauses, expanded military and technological ties, and – though somewhat ambiguously – the prospect of extending the French nuclear umbrella, as hinted by Prime Minister Tusk. “America will no longer be the only protective umbrella. Europe must take responsibility for itself,” Tusk told the Rzeczpospolita daily.
Deep strike deterrence
One area where Poland could play a decisive role in strengthening European autonomy is deep-precision strike capability—particularly in cruise missile procurement, a domain where European industry already excels. While Warsaw had ordered up to 1,800 air-launched missiles from the United States in mid-2024, including the long-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), the current geopolitical climate suggests that seeking solutions closer to home would be the more strategic choice.
Indeed, at MSPO 2025 a few weeks ago, Poland’s WB Group presented the country’s first ever domestic cruise missile project, the Lance, intended to hit targets at an estimated 500-800 kilometres range. The early-stage project is part of broader European efforts to expand deep strike capabilities as a reaction to Russian aggression in the East.
While waiting for the Lanca programme to reach maturity, Poland has shown growing interest in European solutions already available, such as MBDA’s MdCN, with a range of over 1,000 km which could be integrated into the Orka programme to renew Poland’s submarine fleet. That interest goes even further: during an exploratory visit to the Toulon naval base, Poland’s Deputy Defence Minister Paweł Bejda signed a letter of intent with Emmanuel Chiva, then head of France’s Defence procurement agency (DGA), to develop a land-attack cruise missile. The LCM (Land Cruise Missile) could make this ambition a reality. On display at the MSPO exhibition in Kielce in September 2025, this system is derived from the aforementioned MdCN, which has been combat-proven in Syria. According to the Polish website Defence24, a possible “collaboration with Polish industry could cover almost all the components”. The DGA and MBDA are accelerating the pace of final development for a first test firing in 2028 at the latest.
This closer cooperation also raises the prospect of accessing the benefits associated with nuclear deterrence, with Poland increasingly looking to both France and the United Kingdom—Europe’s recognised nuclear powers—as deeper partners in this domain. The Tusk-Macron treaty, while not explicitly nuclear, does open avenues for deeper strategic coordination, including joint missions and mutual support.
Political will
There is certainly broad political convergence across party lines in Poland regarding the Russian threat and the vital need to ramp up defence spending. Warsaw is making by far the most significant budgetary effort in Europe, pressing at NATO summits and EU forums for ambitious collective targets such as 5% of GDP—now enshrined in NATO’s 2025 goals.
At home, the government is galvanising national infrastructure by revitalising the Gdańsk shipyards (PGZ Stocznia Wojenna) to act as anchors for naval programmes, including the Miecznik frigate (based on the UK’s Type-31), and work on minesweepers, support vessels, and the aforementioned Orka-class submarines. Crucially, Poland is also showing signs of edging away from its habitual reliance on U.S. procurement by looking increasingly to European solutions. But this momentum can only translate into true strategic autonomy if partner nations match Poland’s pace—scaling up their own orders and thereby creating the industrial conditions to meet shared needs in time.
Poland is thus well-positioned to assume decisive strategic leadership within Europe, anchoring a stronger defence posture rooted in Polish ambition, European partnership, and a determined effort to deter Moscow on NATO’s eastern flank.
